Epistemic Authority
| Encyclopedia of Terminology for CA and IL: Epistemic Authority | |
|---|---|
| Author(s): | John Heritage (UCLA, USA) (https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8603-6447) |
| To cite: | Heritage, John. (2026). Epistemic Authority. In Alexandra Gubina, Elliott M. Hoey & Chase Wesley Raymond (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Terminology for Conversation Analysis and Interactional Linguistics. International Society for Conversation Analysis (ISCA). DOI: [ ] |
Epistemic authority refers to the superior positioning in terms of knowledge, information or knowhow persons concerning some state of affairs relative to their co-participants in social interaction as a settled and legitimate matter. The term suggests that, relative to others, a participant may be more (K+) or less (K-) knowledgeable in relation to some state of affairs as a matter of socially sustained and public recognition, and that such a participant may prevail over others in the presentation of knowledge or information. Although there can be a close association between epistemic and deontic authority (Heritage 2009, 2019; Lindström & Weatherall 2015; Peräkylä 1998; Stevanovic & Peräkylä 2012; Stivers et al. 2018), the two elements are conceptually quite distinct. While epistemic authority encompasses rights to prevail in terms of information in some field, it does not embrace the deontic right to set the terms for some course of action (see Stevanovic 2023). Sociologically however, epistemic authority and deontic authority can be closely related: they may co-occur or align, and one may give rise to the other especially in professional fields such as medicine, but also in everyday contexts.
Epistemic authority is expressed in ways that involve complementary stances in which authoritative speakers tend to express themselves through assertions with few qualifications, while less authoritative speakers downgrade their assertions using a variety of resources including weak epistemic modals (e.g. She seems like a nice little lady (Heritage and Raymond 2005:18) and tag questions. In the following case, a neighbor evaluates a grandmother’s grandchild using this latter practice: “They're a lovely family now ar'n't they.” (line 3).
(1) [Rah 14: 2] (Heritage & Raymond 2005: 20) 1 Jen: Mm [I: bet they proud o:f the fam'ly.= 2 Ver: [Ye:s. 3 Jen: -> =They're [a luvly family now ar'n't [they. 4 Ver: [°Mm:.° [They are: ye[s. 5 Jen: [eeYe[s::, 6 Ver: [Yes, 7 Jen: Mm: All they need now is a little girl tih complete i:t.
The sequential positioning of these actions can frequently be critical, for example assessments with tag questions downgrade an assertion that is made in first position, but upgrade it in second position (Heritage & Raymond 2005; Raymond & Heritage 2006).
Epistemic authority may derive from a variety of sources. Some of the knowledge possessed by individuals is grounded in their own personal experiences, memories, relationships and so on. Here epistemic authority derives from direct experience, and this is recognized as a primary source of epistemic authority in the many languages of the world that, using evidentials for example, register distinctions between personal experience, inference and hearsay as sources of information while favoring personal experience as a source (Aikhenvald 2004, 2021).
Beyond personal experience, almost every field of human endeavor from pole vaulting, to NASCAR racing to diamond cutting is populated by persons who vary in knowledge, experience, skill and knowhow. The epistemic communities that form around these activities therefore tend to be characterized by epistemic hierarchies. Epistemic authority (and social power; Foucault 1980; Starr 1982) accrues to those at the top of these hierarchies, and will tend to be reciprocated with deference from those lower down.
A variety of professions, most notably medicine and the law, have been established through the formation of organizations with monopoly control over the knowledge and training required to enter the profession (Abbott 1988; Starr 1982). In these cases, the authority of professional expertise can find itself in conflict with epistemic claims deriving from the personal experience of clients despite the institutionalized authority of professionals (Drew & Heritage 1992; Heritage & Clayman 2010; Heritage & Maynard 2006; Peräkylä 1998; 2002; 2006; Stivers et al. 2018). The role of epistemic authority in the creation of power, and the implementation of such power in circumstances of social inequality, can lead to epistemic injuries and injustice (Fricker 2007, 2017).
Additional Related Entries:
Cited References:
Abbott, A. (1988). The System of the Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor. University of Chicago Press.
Aikhenvald, A. Y. (2004). Evidentiality. Oxford University Press.
Aikhenvald, A. Y. (2021). The web of knowledge: Evidentiality at the cross-roads. In The Web of Knowledge (pp. 1-139). Brill.
Drew, P., & Heritage, J. (Eds.). (1992). Talk at Work: Language Use in Institutional and Work-Place Settings. Cambridge University Press.
Foucault, M. (1980). Power/Knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972-1977. Pantheon Books.
Fricker, M. (2007). Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford University Press.
Fricker, M. (2017). Evolving concepts of epistemic injustice. In I. J. Kidd, J. Medina, & G. Pohlhaus Jr. (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice (pp. 53-60). Routledge.
Heritage, J. (2009). Negotiating the Legitimacy of Medical Problems: A Multi-phase Concern for Patients and Physicians. In D. Brashers & D. Goldsmith (Eds.), Communicating to Manage Health and Illness (pp. 147-164). Routledge.
Heritage, J. (2019). The expression of authority in US primary care: Offering diagnoses and recommending treatment. In C. Gordon (Ed.), Approaches to Discourse Analysis (pp. 104-122). Georgetown University Press.
Heritage, J., & Clayman, S. E. (2010). Talk in Action: Interactions, Identities and Institutions. Blackwell-Wiley.
Heritage, J., & Maynard, D. (Eds.). (2006). Communication in Medical Care: Interactions between Primary Care Physicians and Patients. Cambridge University Press.
Heritage, J., & Raymond, G. (2005). The terms of agreement: Indexing epistemic authority and subordination in assessment sequences. Social Psychology Quarterly, 68(1), 15-38.
Lindström, A., & Weatherall, A. (2015). Orientations to epistemics and deontics in treatment discussions. Journal of Pragmatics, 78, 39-53.
Peräkylä, A. (1998). Authority and accountability: The delivery of diagnosis in primary health care. Social Psychology Quarterly, 61(4), 301-320.
Peräkylä, A. (2002). Agency and Authority: Extended responses to diagnostic statements in Primary care encounters. Research on Language and Social Interaction, 35(2), 219-247.
Peräkylä, A. (2006). Communicating and responding to diagnosis. In J. Heritage & D. Maynard (Eds.), Communication in Medical Care: Interactions between Primary Care Physicians and Patients (pp. 214-247). Cambridge University Press.
Raymond, G., & Heritage, J. (2006). The epistemics of social relations: Owning grandchildren. Language in Society, 35, 677-705.
Starr, P. (1982). The Social Transformation of American Medicine. Basic Books.
Stevanovic, Melisa. (2023). Deontics. In Alexandra Gubina, Elliott M. Hoey & Chase Wesley Raymond (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Terminology for Conversation Analysis and Interactional Linguistics. International Society for Conversation Analysis (ISCA).
Stevanovic, M., & Perakyla, A. (2012). Deontic Authority in Interaction: The Right to Announce, Propose, and Decide. Research on Language & Social Interaction, 45(3), 297-321.
Stivers, T., Heritage, J., Barnes, R. K., McCabe, R., Thompson, L., & Toerien, M. (2018). Treatment recommendations as actions. Health Communication, 33(11), 1335-1344.
