Difference between revisions of "Speer2012c"
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{{BibEntry | {{BibEntry | ||
|BibType=ARTICLE | |BibType=ARTICLE | ||
| − | |Author(s)=Susan A. Speer; | + | |Author(s)=Susan A. Speer; |
|Title=The interactional organization of self-praise: epistemics, preference organisation and implications for identity research | |Title=The interactional organization of self-praise: epistemics, preference organisation and implications for identity research | ||
| − | |Tag(s)=EMCA; Epistemics; Preference; Identity; | + | |Tag(s)=EMCA; Epistemics; Preference; Identity; self-praise; preference organization; conversation analysis; self-assessment; identity; compliments; self-repair |
|Key=Speer2012c | |Key=Speer2012c | ||
|Year=2012 | |Year=2012 | ||
| Line 10: | Line 10: | ||
|Number=1 | |Number=1 | ||
|Pages=52-79 | |Pages=52-79 | ||
| + | |DOI=10.1177/0190272511432939 | ||
| + | |Abstract=This article contributes to a social psychological understanding of identity by identifying some features of the interactional organization of self-praise. Early conversation analytic work on the epistemics of self-assessment and constraints against self-praise has shown that praising oneself is an interactionally delicate matter that may leave one vulnerable to “unfavorable character assessment” or accusations of bragging (Pomerantz 1978:89). Drawing on data examples from a range of settings, this article develops Pomerantz’s work and examines the role of reported third-party compliments (e.g., “she . . . said ‘you look really lovely’”) in objectifying self-praise. Analyzing instances in which speakers initiate repair on their self-descriptions in favor of reported third-party compliments, I provide evidence of practices suggesting a norm against direct self-praise and an interactional preference for embedding positive self-descriptions within a third-party attribution. I consider the implications of these analyses for a social psychological understanding of identity and its measurement. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Revision as of 13:00, 3 December 2015
| Speer2012c | |
|---|---|
| BibType | ARTICLE |
| Key | Speer2012c |
| Author(s) | Susan A. Speer |
| Title | The interactional organization of self-praise: epistemics, preference organisation and implications for identity research |
| Editor(s) | |
| Tag(s) | EMCA, Epistemics, Preference, Identity, self-praise, preference organization, conversation analysis, self-assessment, identity, compliments, self-repair |
| Publisher | |
| Year | 2012 |
| Language | |
| City | |
| Month | |
| Journal | Social Psychology Quarterly |
| Volume | 75 |
| Number | 1 |
| Pages | 52-79 |
| URL | |
| DOI | 10.1177/0190272511432939 |
| ISBN | |
| Organization | |
| Institution | |
| School | |
| Type | |
| Edition | |
| Series | |
| Howpublished | |
| Book title | |
| Chapter | |
Abstract
This article contributes to a social psychological understanding of identity by identifying some features of the interactional organization of self-praise. Early conversation analytic work on the epistemics of self-assessment and constraints against self-praise has shown that praising oneself is an interactionally delicate matter that may leave one vulnerable to “unfavorable character assessment” or accusations of bragging (Pomerantz 1978:89). Drawing on data examples from a range of settings, this article develops Pomerantz’s work and examines the role of reported third-party compliments (e.g., “she . . . said ‘you look really lovely’”) in objectifying self-praise. Analyzing instances in which speakers initiate repair on their self-descriptions in favor of reported third-party compliments, I provide evidence of practices suggesting a norm against direct self-praise and an interactional preference for embedding positive self-descriptions within a third-party attribution. I consider the implications of these analyses for a social psychological understanding of identity and its measurement.
Notes
